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Abstract	  
The	   ongoing	   development	   of	   Titanic	   Quarter	   in	   Belfast,	   Northern	   Ireland,	   has	   already	  
made	  significant	  changes	  to	  the	  area.	  The	  site	  on	  which	  the	  Titanic	  was	  built	  has	  been	  
redeveloped	  as	  an	  area	  for	  tourism,	  business,	  education	  and	  the	  creative	  industries.	  The	  
site	   has	   been	   developed	   following	   a	   significant	   inflow	   of	   private	   capital,	   and	  with	   the	  
additional	   support	   of	   local	   government	   and	   public	   finance.	   This	   article	   outlines	   how	  
economic	   and	   political	   forces	   have	   coalesced	   in	   Belfast	   to	   the	   point	   that	   the	   violent	  
period	   of	   the	   ‘Troubles’	   in	   Northern	   Ireland	   can	   be	   said	   to	   have	   created	   a	   ‘pleasingly	  
blank	  canvas	  for	  regeneration’.	  	  	  
	  
	   2	  
Belfast is unique among Western European cities in that more than half of its city centre 
has yet to be redeveloped, creating a pleasingly blank canvas for regeneration. (Harcourt 
Developments, 2007) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 The ethno-political conflict in Northern Ireland — colloquially known as the 
‘Troubles’ — lasted roughly from 1968 to 1998, in its most recent and violent phase. 
Charting a beginning and end to the Troubles is difficult, as the conflict was rooted in 
centuries of strife and political turmoil, and some violence remains to the present day. 
This period in Northern Ireland (NI) was marked by economic stagnation in the province, 
marked by high levels of unemployment (compared to Great Britain). Reports in 2010 
showed that, in the twelve years since the Good Friday Agreement was signed, 
unemployment stood at the same level, and economic inactivity for the NI population 
aged 16-64 at 28.6%  (as compared to the UK average of 23.2) (Magee, 2010). The UK 
Treasury’s ‘subvention’ to NI was realised in higher levels of public sector spending 
compared to England, Scotland and Wales, as the NI economy struggled “to keep pace 
with the restructuring of the British economy in the 1970s and 1980s...” (Darby, 2003). 
When the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) was signed in 1998 (NIO, 1998) (bringing 
relative political stability), many politicians and business people hoped that large 
amounts of capital would flow into NI, thus stimulating the private sector.  This article 
discusses how the effects of political and economic change in NI were played out in the 
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development of the built-environment, as seen in the development of Titanic Quarter 
(TQ).  
 Titanic Quarter, situated on banks of the River Lagan in the capital city Belfast, is a 
mixed residential, commercial and leisure space, at the site where the Titanic was 
constructed. It is similar to many other riverside development projects around the world, 
and has seen the inflow of both large amounts of private capital and public finance, 
outlined later in this article. This has gone towards filling space left over from the period 
of heavy industry and manufacturing (largely focused on ship building) that defined the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries in major UK ports. This article engages with the 
arguments put forward by the developers of TQ that Titanic Quarter is intended for the 
wider benefit of Northern Irish society and its economy, and posits that the emergence of 
TQ must be seen in the wider context of the implementation of marketisation and 
economic liberalisation, trends that have underpinned the development of what is often 
described as the ‘new Northern Ireland’.  It argues that such claims are unfounded, and 
that the development of projects like TQ primarily serves the interests of capitalist 
development, rather than having an extensive social and economic benefit for the wider 
Northern Ireland population. Methodologically, this article is a desk-based study of 
numerous sources, including academic research, reports from government and research 
organisations, company documentation from the lead developer of the Titanic Quarter 
site, and journalistic articles from the BBC and other sources. As these secondary sources 
come from a diverse range of actors and organisations, the reliance on these sources is 
not undue. 
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Establishing ‘conventional economics’ in Northern Ireland 
 
 The key ideological message driven by both the Irish and British states is that 
 peace dividends are to be achieved through conventional economics. A 
 dropping unemployment rate, additional and religiously mixed middle-income 
 employment and a vibrant city-centre nightlife are meant to show that Belfast 
 is ‘booming’ in a different way. (Shirlow, 2006, p.101) 
 
In his discussion of Belfast as a ‘post-conflict’ city, Shirlow (2006) outlines the approach 
that is increasingly being taken to understanding NI. Following the cessation of the worst 
violence from the Troubles, Belfast is now seen as a site ripe for the implementation of 
‘conventional economics’, seen in the expansion of the market economy, the push for 
foreign direct investment, the withdrawal of the state from the market to bring it more 
into line with Great Britain and other west European states, and speculation in the land 
and property market. This approach can be effectively summarised by a statement from 
Colin Lewis of Invest NI, (a public body that supports the private sector): “Once Belfast 
had a terrible reputation and now it’s regarded as normal” (as cited in Neill, 2006, p.112). 
For Invest NI, normalisation involves the goal of increasing “business productivity and 
boost[ing] Northern Ireland’s Gross Value Added (GVA) per employee, which is around 
20 per cent lower that the UK average” (Invest Northern Ireland, 2012, p.1). Such a 
policy position flows from the positions of successive British governments, and the 
settled position of New Labour post-1998 (after the signing of the GFA, when it was held 
that NI must begin to stand on its feet economically), and reinforced in the St. Andrews 
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Agreement (NIO, 2007). Bairner (2006) notes that while such documents ratify relative 
levels of peace and stability, property developers and others had already decided to target 
NI as a site of much untapped potential: “Capital investors did not need to wait for a 
formal document to realise that the cessation of widespread random acts of violence 
together with the IRA’s focus on economic and prestige targets in England had turned 
Belfast into place where rich profits could be made” (Bairner, 2006, p.125). Indeed, 
Belfast became seen by investors as a site ripe for investment, encapsulated in the 
publication of reports such as Economics in Peacemaking: Lessons from Northern 
Ireland (Portland Trust, 2007).  
 
 In the private housing market in NI, prices that had been kept low for decades due 
to the Troubles (as compared to similar housing in the Republic of Ireland (ROI) and 
Great Britain) rose sharply in value. The Nationwide bank reported in 2007 that “House 
prices in Northern Ireland fell in the wake of the violence and the manufacturing decline 
of the 1970s but began to rise again in the early 1990s when the peace process gathered 
momentum and the growth of manufacturing in Northern Ireland started to outpace 
growth of this sector in the rest of the UK” (as cited in Portland Trust, 2007, p.3). In the 
built-environment, the biggest changes that occurred were in the private homes market. 
Belfast became populated with cheaply and quickly constructed apartment complexes, 
designed in a way as to make them indistinguishable from other UK or European cities. 
While the housing market had previously been marked by an absence of private 
apartments (such dwellings rather being used as social housing), these soon became a 
feature along Belfast’s Lagan River, not far from the site of TQ. From 2007 onwards, NI 
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house prices went into decline, with the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors finding 
that average house prices fell 48 per cent between the peak of the market and 2012 (as 
cited in Canning, 2012). Given that a lot of investment in NI was from the ROI, when the 
Irish housing market collapsed many Irish investors could no longer service their debts. 
As a result, many NI assets transferred into the ownership of the ROI government’s ‘bad 
bank’, NAMA (National Asset Management Agency, established in December 2009). As 
of 2012, NAMA held £3.35 bn worth of property in NI (4 per cent of NAMA’s total 
assets) (Fitzpatrick, 2012). In June 2012, as though to highlight the severity of the house 
price problem in NI, the chairman of the global-national bank RBS Sir Philip Hampton 
singled out its Irish division as the company’s biggest cause for concern. Hampton stated 
that the Ulster Bank had “overdosed” on property development, and that the RBS “simply 
didn't expect the scale of problems in Ireland” (BBC, 2012a). While this is reflective of 
the Ulster Bank’s activities throughout the whole all of Ireland (in both NI and the ROI), 
it is worth noting that the population of NI is relatively small, standing in 2012 at an 
estimated 1.81 million people (NISRA, 2012). Restated, NI contributed in 
proportionately high terms to the failure at RBS, encapsulated by its 82 percent 
nationalisation in 2008 by the UK government (BBC, 2012b), and its posting of the 
biggest annual loss in UK corporate history. NI is sometimes lauded as ‘punching above 
its weight’ in terms of culture (sport, music, film) on the UK stage, but in this case it 
punched above its weight in terms of financial collapse in the UK property market. 
Today, while Northern Ireland’s economy remains in better condition compared to that of 
the ROI, the UK Treasury public spending cuts put it in a precarious position (Kaufmann, 
2012). This situation means that NI’s politicians have difficult economic choices to make, 
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such as those regarding the cut in corporation tax that some propose, to bring NI in line 
with the taxation rate in the ROI. Another issue is the extent to which NI politicians 
continue to use the state to fund private sector development here, given that cases like TQ 
show that property developers are often the primary benefactors, at the expense of 
economic development that has a wider social impact.  
 
 
The ‘New Northern Ireland’ 
 
 The drive for the establishment of ‘conventional economics’ in NI is often 
accompanied by a discourse that has emerged, seen clearly in the descriptor the ‘New 
Northern Ireland’. Here, the ‘New Northern Ireland’ tends to denote that the country has 
shifted from violence and conflict to a post-conflict, consumer society, where 
sectarianism and social ills are swept aside by gentrification. The discourse of the ‘New 
Northern Ireland’, defines itself in difference to the ‘Old Northern Ireland’ (though this 
phrase is rarely used), which by implication can be taken to refer to a backward and 
underdeveloped country, blighted by political violence and the ‘ills’ of underdeveloped 
market economy.  This can be seen in particular in voluntary and third sector 
documentation. In a recent Community Relations Council report, Nolan (2012) argues 
that “A new, confident, and neutral urban culture has emerged”, where in Belfast and 
Londonderry “Attention has focused more on the relaxed environment of the city centres, 
which now boast a new ‘cappuccino culture’” (p.10). In response to Nolan we can think 
here of Sharon Zukin’s phrase, “pacification by cappuccino” (as cited in Harvey, 2008, 
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p.31), where progress in NI is measured according to the availability of frothy coffee. 
Further evidence is provided by Nolan in the form of the presence of the MTV Europe 
Music Awards in Belfast in 2011, and Londonderry’s status as 2012 UK City of Culture. 
For corroboration, Nolan points to the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (NILT) 
and work by the Institute for Conflict Research (ICR), which indicates that there are more 
perceived ‘neutral’ areas than in the past, including shopping areas (Hamilton at al., 
2008). However, these areas often exist alongside segregated areas, where residential 
segregation is the primary form of segregation, alongside education and access to 
sporting facilities (Byrne et al., 2006; Hamilton et al., 2008).  Nolan (2012) does accept 
that “geographical and class boundaries persist” (p.10), the thrust of his argument is that a 
‘New Northern Ireland’ has emerged, and that this is a positive thing: “For those with the 
means to participate, though, the new consumer culture is nonetheless real and marks a 
stage in the journey away from street violence, and towards a new sense of identity for 
Northern Ireland” (Nolan, 2012, p.10).  
 
 Harvey (2008), writing on urban development, argues that “Even the incoherent, 
bland and monotonous suburban tract development that continues to dominate in many 
areas now gets its antidote in a ‘new urbanism’ movement that touts the sale of 
community and boutique lifestyles to fulfill urban dreams” (p. 32). ‘Fulfilling urban 
dreams’ through ‘boutique lifestyles’ has a relatively short history in NI, due to the 
impact of the Troubles, and the accompanying lack of development of the retail and 
leisure sectors. Shirlow (2006) and Bairner (2006) outline the role of consumption and 
the construction of consumer spaces in NI. Shirlow (2006) notes that in Belfast, “The 
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construction of the Castle Court shopping mall, out of glass in a zone of conflict, in the 
1980s was a key symbol of state control and increasing confidence. Future state 
expenditure on the riverfront and the use of funds to create a modern cityscape also 
indicated the desire to present a normal place” (pp.100-101). Moreover, Bairner (2006) 
draws on the development of Victoria Square — the successor to Castle Court, ostensibly 
marketed at a ‘boutique’ lifestyle —and criticises the extent to which the development of 
a ‘City centre public realm’ is a positive step. He argues: “First, there is the implication 
that more shops mean happier citizens and indeed that building projects are directly 
linked to the emergence of a society free from political violence—hence, ‘the better and 
brighter future’ that is promised” (Bairner, 2006, p.129). This was seen clearly in an 
advertising banner that was draped around cranes at the construction site of Victoria 
Square that read: ‘A renaissance for Belfast’ (McAllister, 2009, p.19). While both sites 
respectively were seen at the time of construction as being emblematic of change — 
Castle Court in the early stages of peace and progress, Victoria Square in the property 
boom years — both were ultimately sites of capital accumulation that saw substantial 
decline for their owners. In 2012, Castle Court was sold by the multi-national Westfield, 
reportedly now worth half of the £350 million it was worth before the crash (BBC, 
2012c). In 2011, Victoria Square had lost £29 million from its original valuation £349 
million in 2008, with the German company CGI Hausinvest making the loss (BBC, 
2011).   
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Remaining segregation in Belfast 
 
 Shirlow and Murtagh’s (2006) description of Belfast goes some way to grasping the 
complexity of the city: “It is one of those places within which history, identity and culture 
are played out, in a dramatic and public manner, through the instruments of threat, 
menace, violence and deviance” (p.2). Despite the major improvements in levels of peace 
compared to the worst years of the Troubles, and major changes in the provision of 
leisure and shopping facilities, Belfast remains a deeply divided and segregated city 
(Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006), with the population largely divided along sectarian lines in 
terms of housing, and with 93.5% of children educated in separate Catholic and 
Protestant schools (Nolan, 2012). No better is this encapsulated than by the fact that when 
the Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1998 there were 22 peace walls, but by 2010 
there were 48 (Nolan, 2012, p.71). By another measurement – that based on work carried 
out by the Belfast Interface Project (2012) – there are 99 “different security barriers and 
forms of defensive architecture across the city associated with residential areas” (p.11). 
This contributes to a situation where the “vast majority of segregated residential districts 
are working class, spaces which hosted nearly all sectarian violence” (Nagle, 2009a, 
p.328). The city centre of Belfast remains contested, where Nationalists have sought 
equal access to what was once Unionist “sacred space” (Nagle, 2009b), seen clearly in 
the riots that emanated after Belfast City Council voted in 2012 to only fly the Union 
Jack (flag of the UK) over the city hall on certain dates, rather than every day of the year. 
Into this context, Shirlow and Murtagh’s point, that “divided cities are places of passion, 
commitment and unwavering belief” (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006, p.2), seems as 
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prevalent as ever. Indeed, we can turn Nagle and Clancy (2012), who summarising the 
prevailing positions of many scholars working on Northern Irish issues, show that “social 
segregation and political polarisation appear to be intensifying” (p. 79).  
 
 
Titanic Quarter: outlining the project 
 
 TQ stands in a long line of post-industrial waterfront regeneration projects seen 
around the world, with land being changed from industrial usage to use for housing, 
leisure and the creative and service industries. Similar sites that helped inform the plans 
for TQ include Malmo (Sweden), Barcelona (Spain) and the Leith Ocean Terminal 
(Scotland, where the Royal Yacht Brittannia is kept) (Titanic Quarter, 2005). A number 
of other studies have focused on waterfront developments in various settings around the 
world. Desfor and Jørgensen (2004) address flexible governance practices in 
development in Copenhagen, and Ferreira and Visser (2007) focus on the case of the 
Victoria and Alfred Waterfront in Cape Town. Jauhiainen (1995) addresses Barcelona, 
Cardiff and Genoa, while McCarthy (1998) focused on the waterfront at Dundee, 
Scotland while at the development stage. Jones (1998) reviews a range of UK projects, 
while Richard Marshall’s collection Waterfronts in Post Industrial Cities (2001) surveyed 
settings as diverse as Bilbao and Shanghai. Specifically in the case of TQ in Belfast, the 
establishment of the project was foregrounded by the Laganside Development 
Corporation, a public body established by set up by the Northern Ireland Office (ministry 
of the UK government) with the aim of regenerating the area around the Lagan River that 
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had largely fallen into disuse. Quoting from architects Shepheard, Epstein and 
Hunter/BDP, Neill (2006) notes that there was an impetus in Belfast “to transform 
completely the environmental quality of a vital part of the City, and by this means to help 
transform perceptions of Belfast at an international level” (p.109). Shirlow and Murtagh 
(2006), call Laganside “Belfast’s most successful attempt to spatially construct the 
growth economy…” (p.164). In operation from 1989-2007, the primary corporate aim of 
the Laganside Development Corporation was: “To secure the regeneration of the 
Laganside designated area to the stage where private sector development and investment 
will continue without major public intervention” (p.2). However, criticisms of Laganside 
were heard from different quarters, as Shirlow and Murtagh summarise: Laganside was 
criticised as “an exclusive Thatcherite property project that failed to connect with the 
city’s disadvantaged and margianalised” (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006, p.165) (from 
William Neill), while the OECD argued that it had failed to “impact on the poorest 
people and areas” (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006, p.166).  Despite this, the valedictory 
report from Laganside states that the area around the Lagan River had become, following 
the work of the Laganside Corporation, a “place of opportunity for all” (Laganside 
Corporation, 2007, p.10) (a theme the report repeats multiple times). In terms of the 
timing of the setting up of Laganside, triggering the wider development of the area 
around the River Lagan and the later development of TQ, it should be noted that the 
impetus for state supported capitalist development of the built-environment preceded the 
arrival of peace. As Laganside was set up in 1989, this came some five years before the 
IRA ceasefire of 1994. Before relative peace was secured (many atrocities were still to 
follow), the regeneration of this area of Belfast was in the planning stage. Across the 
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River Lagan from TQ, and about 0.5km away, the Belfast Waterfront (originally the 
Waterfront Hall) was opened in 1997, with the purpose of hosting international concerts 
and conferences. Built and operated by Belfast City Council, the venue has a place in the 
history books of the Northern Ireland peace process, as it was the location in May 1998 
for John Hume and David Trimble appearing together on stage in an unprecedented show 
of unity ahead of the referendum on the GFA. One of the first buildings at the site where 
TQ is located was the Odyssey Arena, an indoor stadium and leisure facility, hosting 
international concerts and British Ice Hockey team, the Belfast Giants. Opened in 2000, 
the project was part-funded by the Laganside Development Corporation. Like the Belfast 
Waterfront, it hosts international concerts, and also conferences, albeit on a much larger 
scale.  
 
 TQ is a site totaling 185 acres, situated at Queen’s Island, where the Titanic was 
built, at the end of Belfast Lough (in east Belfast). The land where TQ is located is 
“owned by Belfast Harbour Commissioners and leased to Titanic Quarter Limited and 
Titanic Properties Limited” (Titanic Quarter, 2005, p.2). Despite being termed by one of 
the involved parties as the “one of the world’s largest city centre regeneration projects” 
(Titanic Quarter, 2005, p.2), the site is not part of the ‘city centre’ which is approximately 
1 km away (in terms of the CBD), and is rather different in terms of its lack of major 
shopping outlets compared to the CBD. As noted above, Belfast city centre remains 
contested, while the area that TQ is located is not contested. The initial Development 
Framework for TQ planned for “Up to 5000 dwellings including apartments and 
townhouses; A high quality business quarter. The total business/office/R&D floor space 
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will be 180,000m²; Commercial development of some 130,000m²” (Titanic Quarter, 
2005, p.2). Future plans include the inclusion of “24-acre Science Park; 600,000 sq ft 
Financial Services Centre; 1.4m sq ft commercial space … 64,000 sq ft movie studio … 
up to five hotels; 450,000 sq ft leisure space” (Titanic Belfast, 2011, p.11). As of 2012, 
there are some eighty companies based there (including Citi Group and Microsoft) and 
474 completed apartments, alongside the Public Records Office of NI, and a campus of 
the city’s further education college. Visitors to TQ find a fairly pleasant and interesting 
space, albeit one which remains quite sparsely filled. It has retained an aura of its 
maritime past – one can stand on the site where the Titanic was constructed – but gives 
plenty of clues to its raison d'être as a space for capital accumulation, especially in the 
apartment blocks that appear garish alongside some buildings at TQ that are over one 
hundred years old. A relative coup for TQ has been the number of high-profile film and 
television productions that have been filmed in ‘The Paint Hall’, currently leased to 
Northern Ireland Screen. The building that formerly was used for painting Harland and 
Wolff ships, has been used for the filming of City of Ember (2008), Your Highness 
(2011) and for the major HBO television series Game of Thrones (2011—) (Titanic 
Belfast, 2011). The Paint Hall was expanded and renamed Titanic Studios in March 2012. 
Referring to the production of Game of Thrones, the NI First Minister Peter Robinson 
stated: “The transformation of the Paint Hall from the last remnant of our once great ship 
building tradition to the largest stage in Europe is an example of our flexibility and our 
commitment to innovation” (BBC, 2010). While engaged in the creative industries (as 
emblematic of the new economy), the developer Harcourt also seeks to tie TQ to history, 
stating “Once more, the area will be the engine room for the city’s growth and economic 
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prosperity, while building on and celebrating the maritime history of the area” (Harcourt 
Developments, 2007, p.15), and that TQ is “firmly rooted in the history and character of 
Belfast” (Titanic Quarter, 2006). The shift is cast in post-industrial terms by Harcourt 
Developments, both reflecting and underpinning Belfast’s shift from a manufacturing 
super-power (at its peak it was one of the largest ship builders in the world): “Where once 
they grew ships, we’re now going to grow a community – one of the finest residential, 
working, educational and office communities.” (p.30). But such a claim is rather 
misleading, suggesting that ship building and post-industrial office spaces in Belfast can 
be interchangeable, in terms of the employment opportunities they offer. Rather, east 
Belfast has never had the jobs replaced that were lost with the mass decline of ship 
building. Here we can evoke Weber (2002), whose critical study of capital accumulation 
and the built-environment seems very applicable to the case of TQ: “At various points in 
its circulation, the built environment is junked, abandoned, destroyed, and selectively 
reconstructed. The physical shells of agin industrial orders may sit dormant for decades 
before being cleared for a new high-tech ‘campus’” (p.521).  
 
Understanding the location of TQ in Belfast from a social and economic 
perspective is important to setting TQ into the wider context of the political-economic 
geography of Belfast. Importantly, TQ is located in a traditionally Protestant/Unionist 
area of Belfast that suffers from deprivation in multiple areas to a relatively large extent, 
as compared to the rest of Northern Ireland. This is seen in the Northern Ireland Multiple 
Deprivation Measure (NIMDM), which studies deprivation across seven measurements: 
“income, employment, health, education, proximity to services, living environment and 
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crime” (NISRA, 2010, p.5), across 890 ‘Super Output Areas’, comprised of 
approximately 2,000 people. A more precise measurement is that of Output Areas (OA), 
with 5,022 OAs comprised of approximately 350 people. In the 2010 NIMDM findings, 
if taken as a sub-set of multiple-deprivation, the majority of those areas most deprived in 
terms of income are located in Belfast and Derry (NISRA, 2010). In terms of multiple-
deprivation, 24 of the 25 most deprived OAs were in the local government district of 
Belfast (the one exception being in Derry). The Super Output Area that Titanic Quarter is 
located in (Island 1) is ranked 90 (out of 890) in terms of Multiple Deprivation. The more 
precise Output Area (95GG290003) is ranked 1108 (out of 5022) in terms of Multiple 
Deprivation. If taken across both these measurements, TQ it is located in an area that is 
the top 10-22% of the most deprived areas in NI. Showing the great contrasts in Belfast, 
the least deprived SOA in Northern Ireland – ‘Cherryvalley 2’ (NISRA, 2010, p.56) – is 
located only 5km away (approximately) from TQ. Surrounded by areas that housed a 
population employed to a large extent in the shipyards, TQ is located in an area of Belfast 
that reflects wider social and economic trends in NI that are “a product of the declining 
structures of traditional industrial capitalism and the new currents of post-industrialism” 
(Bean, 2007, p.18). In this context, Harvey (2006) mentions Northern Ireland’s “long-
standing problems … as a site for capital accumulation” given its history of conflict 
(p.103). However, Harvey (2010) notes that Northern Ireland is an example of a country 
where the deprivation and dispossession of people has “little directly to do with capitalist 
accumulation”, and where there is no necessary link to “anti-capitalist politics” (p.247). 
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A political-economy of Titanic Quarter 
 
 The corporate structure of the group of companies under Harcourt Developments 
that have a controlling interest in TQ is complex. Titanic Investments Ltd was 
incorporated on 11th September 2003, under Jersey law, as a subsidiary of Harcourt 
Developments. In turn, Titanic Investments Ltd owns Titanic Island Ltd, which itself 
controls Ivy Wood Properties Ltd. Ivy Wood Properties in turn controls a group of nine 
subsidiaries that includes Titanic Quarter Ltd, a company registered in NI. Titanic Island 
Ltd is “the main property development company at the Queen's Island site”, and is a 
financial entity of considerable size in its own right (Simpson, 2011). Simpson (2011) 
notes that the company’s operating profit in 2010 was £16 million, while the value of 
“land and property held for development” in 2011 was £96 million (falling from a 2009 
peak of £112 million).  The primary rationale for the development of TQ is economic: to 
bring economic benefits for the developer, and supposedly to bring economic benefits for 
the Belfast and wider Northern Irish citizenry. (“The fundamental goal for the 
development of Titanic Quarter is to achieve high quality investment and development in 
Belfast”) (Titanic Quarter, 2005, p.3). In this respect TQ is no different to wider trends of 
urban regeneration, the development of the built-environment and the accumulation of 
capital. For example, Harvey (2008) notes that “since urbanization depends on the 
mobilization of a surplus product, an intimate connection emerges between the 
development of capitalism and urbanization” (p.24). Belfast, as is discussed elsewhere in 
this article, is particularly susceptible to this kind of development, given its history of 
violence and the destruction of vast swathes of its built environment. Indeed for Harvey, 
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urbanization takes its place alongside military expenditure as one of the key sites in the 
economy for “absorbing the surplus product that capitalists perpetually produce in their 
search for profits” (Harvey, 2008, p.25). However, Harcourt Developments chose to 
focus in their promotional literature not on the economic benefits it was due to reap, but 
rather on the wider benefits to the area and the city. Thus Harcourt Developments (2007) 
suggested the “development is expected to create at least 20,000 new jobs over the next 
15 years, and bring in £1.5 billion of investment” (p.15), (or 30,000 jobs and £2 billion of 
investment over a 20 year period) (p.17), claims made before the global financial crises 
that may be significantly limited in their realisation.  
 
 Another main reason for the development of TQ is to bring benefit to the 
construction industry. NI has relied on this in part for the underpinning of its economy, 
especially in the replacement of other parts of its economy which have been in decline 
(especially in manufacturing output, in line with the rest of the UK). Within five years 
since the TQ Master Plan being published (2006-2011), construction contracts at TQ 
were valued at £175m, which it was claimed had gone on the whole to NI companies 
(Titanic Quarter, 2011). In 2011, 500 construction workers were working at TQ, which 
according to the developer Harcourt Developments (through the subsidiary Titanic 
Quarter Ltd.) made it “the largest building site on the island of Ireland” (Titanic Quarter, 
2011). This £175m was called by Mike Smith, then TQ Ltd’s CEO “a ‘down payment' for 
the local economy” (Titanic Quarter, 2011). Smith’s proposition is debatable from an 
economic point of view and one that needs tested, given the limited effect overall that TQ 
might have throughout NI, and rather as a project that primarily benefits the developer. 
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His statement is also ideological to the extent that it suggests that construction firms 
might play a more fundamental role in the political culture in NI. In this sense, companies 
like Harcourt Developments have come to see themselves as being indispensable 
political-economic actors, benignly benefiting the people of NI with their construction 
projects. Corroboration to this claim is given in a 2005 statement by Harcourt, who 
claimed that in relation to Belfast, TQ is “essential to the future prosperity of the city as a 
whole” (Titanic Quarter, 2005, p.1), a claim that is not quantifiable, at least in the short to 
medium term. Despite this — as is shown below in a section on TQ and local and 
regional government — developers like Harcourt enjoy almost unequivocal support for 
their activities from various bodies of the state and of government, and from individual 
politicians, in a way that is not proportionate with the benefits they have brought to the 
economy and to Northern Ireland society. The extent which this is the case was 
encapsulated in a statement by Peter Robinson, when he argued that Titanic Belfast was 
“one of the key projects we are looking for, for our tourist industry... with massive 
potential for the construction industry … This is the very kind of project we need to assist 
in these difficult financial times” (BBC, 2008). 
 
 
The Titanic visitor centre 
 
 At the centre of TQ lies the £77 million Titanic ‘Signature Building’, Titanic 
Belfast, which opened in 2012. It was conceptualised by CivicArts, and designed by 
Todd Architects (BBC, 2012d). The majority of the funding for the building came from 
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the public sector (Department of Enterprise (DETI) - NI Tourist Board £36.95m; Belfast 
Harbour Commissioners £13.6m; Belfast City Council £10m) (Magee, 2012). Harcourt 
Developments paid £16.35m towards its cost through Titanic Quarter Ltd (representative 
of 21.2 per cent of the total cost). While the building is owned by a charitable trust — 
Titanic Foundation Ltd — “All proceeds from the building belong to the centre operator 
Titanic Belfast Ltd” (owned by Harcourt Developments) (“A charitable trust, Titanic 
Foundation Ltd will own the building. The operator has to pay Titanic Foundation Ltd 
£200k and put £600K into a trust each year to refresh the attraction”) (Magee, 2012). 
Here is it is worthy of note that while DETI applied for part of the public funding for the 
project to be supplied by the EU, the EU “has questioned the application on the basis 
there was a lack of competition in Titanic Quarter Ltd (TQL) selecting an associated 
company, Harcourt Construction (NI) Ltd to undertake the building work” (Magee, 
2012). As things stand the EU have noted the strong connections between public and 
private sectors, and have problematised the extent to which Harcourt Developments may 
be set to benefit considerably from extensive public funding, with considerable amounts 
of public finance becoming subsumed by private capital. Perhaps one of the most 
noteworthy features of Titanic Belfast is that “Based on projected visitor numbers, it is 
one of the most expensive buildings of its kind in Europe ... Per visitor, it cost more than 
Disneyland in Paris, is almost three times more expensive than the Guggenheim in 
Bilbao, and cost about seven times more than the Tate Modern” (Magee, 2012). Despite 
this concern therefore over the wider viability of the project, Arlene Foster — the 
Democratic Unionist Party minister responsible for tourism in NI — blamed the media 
for “fuelling and giving voice to negativity about the scheme”, and noted that she was 
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“‘frustrated to the ends of the earth’ by people talking down the Titanic Signature 
project” (as cited in Shapiro, 2012). This is seen in the light of the wider context of the 
DUP blaming the local press and media for its perceived negative coverage of its 
legislative agenda; for the DUP, the press should also be a cheer leader for economic 
development (see the March 2009 letter from Peter Robinson, jointly with Deputy First 
Minister Martin McGuinness criticising the Belfast Telegraph’s journalism on the NI 
Executive Programme For Government) (OFMDFM, 2009).  
 
 
Titanic Quarter and the relationship with local and regional government 
 
 The supporting role of local government in the development of TQ was rather 
fundamental to its progression, and the project received widespread political and financial 
support from local and regional government in NI. At Belfast City Council, Gerry 
Copeland evoked the concept of a ‘blank canvas’ (which will be explored in more detail 
later), underlining the role in the economic development of local government as a ‘cheer-
leader’ for development: “That area of the city has obviously declined since its industrial 
use. But now we have almost a blank canvas and an opportunity to create a new future 
and to shift the whole city, east of the river” (in reference to the River Lagan which 
bisects Belfast) (as cited in Harcourt Developments, 2007, p.37). Moreover, Peter 
McNaney, Chief Executive of Belfast City Council stated: “It ticks all the right boxes: 
introducing new industries and increasing the skills base to help diversify the city’s 
employment base into the knowledge economy...” (Harcourt Developments, 2007, p.17). 
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In this respect, McNaney’s vision is realised in the Citi Group complex at TQ, which 
placed a ‘Centre of Excellence’ in Belfast, serving its European operations. The then 
Lord Mayor of Belfast, Cllr. Pat Convery argued TQ “will generate not just significant 
economic benefits, but a wide range of social benefits which have the potential to 
improve the quality of life for everyone in the City” (Titanic Quarter, 2010). Quite what 
these social benefits are, or how they could be realised in an area of significant multiple 
depravation, such as the one in which TQ is located, is something that remains to be seen. 
Viewing TQ as something for all the people of Belfast (or NI is a problematic notion), 
which is something that the rhetoric from elected local politicians or local government 
officials rarely fully addresses. Rather, such language goes to offer further support for 
capital accumulation, despite mentioning the obligatory benefits for the wider population 
of Belfast. One level up from local government in NI is the Northern Ireland Assembly, 
within which the Executive holds devolved powers on a range of legislation from 
Westminster, and works in tandem with the ROI government through the North-South 
ministerial council. Here, the majority view was that the establishment of TQ was 
positive. One dissenting view came from Dawn Purvis, then a member of the Northern 
Ireland Assembly for the minor unionist party, the Progressive Unionist Party 
(representing the East Belfast constituency which contains TQ). While Purvis called TQ 
“fantastic news”, she noted that the project might have limited benefit for working class 
people in East Belfast: “It's not just about offering jobs - it's about building the capacity 
and skills of the people in order to take up those opportunities” (BBC, 2008). Some 
similar criticism was seen in the words of Robin Newton, a DUP MLA. Newton argued, 
critically, that the project needed to bring social as well as economic benefits to the 
	   23	  
people of the area: 
All too often we have seen as part of the so-called gentrification process, 
shiny new apartment blocks going up, built by companies and workmen with 
no connections to the local community, which are effectively segregated from 
the neighbourhoods in which they appear and occupied by people with no 
stake in the local community – this cannot be the case in East Belfast. 
(Newton, 2007) 
 
 
Wider political discourse and Titanic Quarter 
 
 As Secretary of State for NI, the New Labour Minister Peter Hain stated: “Our 
shared vision is that the whole TQ development will make a unique contribution to 
regenerate and revitalise this site and contribute to a more prosperous future for Northern 
Ireland” (Harcourt Developments, 2007, p.43). As a statement from a New Labour 
minister, there is nothing particularly surprising in Hain’s point. What it does show is that 
at the UK national level NI’s progress is to be viewed through a lens of economic 
development realised in capital accumulation in the built-environment. More significant 
was the interpretation of his statement by Harcourt Developments, that argued: “This is 
probably one of the only times that a British government minister has said something that 
all the people of Belfast can agree with” (Harcourt Developments, 2007, p.43). Here 
Harcourt Developments seems to be suggesting that economic development trumps 
politics, and that the reduction of violent political conflict can lead two historically 
opposed communities to share in the interests of capitalist development. But more than 
this, the view of Harcourt is that it must develop in this way. Any ambiguity on this point 
was dispelled by Conal Harvey, director of operations at Harcourt Developments. He 
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argued “Northern Ireland’s future must be driven economically. Everything hangs on 
people having the lifestyle opportunities, and reasons to put their history of conflict 
behind them. TQ is symbolic of the new Northern Ireland” (Harcourt Developments, 
2007, p.17). Perhaps the statement is particularly pointed for the Nationalist population 
(who favour the joining of NI with ROI). The notion is clear: post-GFA, nationalists need 
no longer to be concerned with political struggle, but instead simply need to focus on the 
transition to being a consumer-driven ‘normal society’. Indeed, Martin McGuinness (as 
NI’s Deputy First Minister, 2007—present) has stuck very close to the pro-business line 
of the Democratic Unionist Party. McLaughlin and Baker (2010) in The Propaganda of 
Peace highlight one of the watershed moments in this transition, when at the opening of 
the IKEA store in Belfast (December 2007) Ian Paisley of the DUP and Martin 
McGuinness sat on an IKEA sofa beneath the slogan ‘Home is the Most Important Place 
in the World’ (cf. Jewesbury and Porter, 2010). Following the GFA and the St. Andrews 
agreement, the setting up of the power sharing institutions and relative peace, there is an 
agreed interpretation: peace has come; it is time to have a normal society; today, normal 
societies spend money. The best way to reach conflict resolution is to turn the antagonists 
into consumers. Rather than fighting on the streets, Northern Ireland’s people ought to be 
fighting for the best bargains in the aisles. 
 
A ‘pleasingly blank’ canvas: viewing Belfast’s ‘post-conflict’ spaces 
 In its promotional literature for TQ, Harcourt Developments is especially frank 
about how it views urban development in Belfast in light of the Troubles: 
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 Belfast is unique among Western European cities in that more than half of 
 its city centre has yet to be redeveloped, creating a pleasingly blank canvas 
 for regeneration. True, the circumstances that led to this are unfortunate. 
 The  violence that plagued the province for 32 years, until peace was 
 declared by the IRA, meant  that Belfast was completely underdeveloped 
 and under- regenerated compared to English cities of the same size. 
 (Harcourt Developments, 2007, p.44) 
 
To link NI’s recent past of violence so explicitly to development potential in a public 
document is quite revealing, and shows the extent to which the city of Belfast is seen by 
developers as a space for development and capital accumulation, despite its history. To 
say the circumstances are ‘unfortunate’ is grossly inadequate. It is correct that due to the 
violent past of NI, the built-environment was blighted in such a way that it left many 
prime development sites free for development. While the immediate area that TQ is 
located in was spared the levels of violence seen elsewhere, Harcourt Developments 
appear to take a wider view of Belfast and the potential it offers. Following the cessation 
of the worst levels of the Troubles, the development of the built-environment in Belfast 
offers developers the opportunity to accumulate large amount of capital. To do so, Belfast 
has become seen and indeed constructed in discourse as a post-conflict city (MacKenzie 
and Porter, 2011). Jewesbury and Porter (2010) note that economic and political forces 
have coalesced to shape “the image of contemporary Belfast” in such a way (p.35). The 
development of a post-conflict city involves for Jewesbury and Porter (2010) the 
development of a “moralising politics of social and economic development” (p.36):  
  
 
 By this we mean that there is a strong connection between the twin narratives of 
political progress and social-economic development in contemporary Belfast; 
that post-Agreement Belfast has, to a significant degree, become a story in which 
the twin moral goods of political progress and privatised, neo-liberal economic 
development are folded into one another. (Jewesbury and Porter, 2010, p.36) 
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To apply this argument directly to TQ, we can say that the development has wrapped up 
with it ‘twin moral goods’ they refer to. TQ is cast as being emblematic of the ‘New 
Northern Ireland’, where political progress enables a leisure culture based around 
consumption. TQ is cast as a prime example of how private economic development, with 
the support of public finance, can supposedly benefit the whole of the economy and by 
extension the people of NI. Political process and economic development, when realised 
through construction, can thus realise the “normative promise of the depoliticisation or 
neutralisation of public space” central to establishing “Belfast as a post-conflict city” 
(Jewesbury and Porter, 2010, p.35). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The claim that TQ will benefit all of the people of NI is problematic. While there 
has been modest stimulation of the wider construction sector as a result of the project, 
and a largely disused industrial site has been made more aesthetically pleasing, the 
primary benefactors from TQ are Harcourt Developments. The discourse that surrounds 
TQ that is almost entirely supportive — from local politicians and from the media (this 
article has not had the space to deal with this latter group) — needs to become much 
more critical, shifting to a place that is more reflective of wider political-economic 
conditions in NI, and the lack of impact that a project like TQ has on the average citizen. 
NI has struggled with the move to ‘conventional economics’, especially with regards to 
	   27	  
the property market. While many enjoyed high rewards from rising property values for a 
period, the market has now all but collapsed and may take many years to recover. Large 
property developers continue to speculate in NI, despite the collapse. While greatly 
reduced property prices might be expected to lead to a more equitable market, early 
suggestions are that those with the resources will simply purchase more property than 
ever, thus entrenching inequality. Rather than moving to further marketisation, politicians 
with responsibility for NI need to realise that this is not necessarily the best economic 
path. Here it could be suggested that UK government needs to consider NI a special 
economic case for decades to come, with the subvention continuing for a long time yet. 
Moreover, TQ provides a concrete case study of how the so-called ‘New Northern 
Ireland’ was established through the coalescing of political and economic forces, and 
how historical conditions can be neatly negated for the opportunity of development. The 
violent history of Northern Ireland suggests that it should never be considered a 
“pleasingly blank canvas”, but rather as a space blighted by violence with great human 
cost attached. Future research on Titanic Quarter may be strengthened by conducting 
interviews with representatives from Harcourt Developments and relevant government 
agencies, and also with local and regional politicians. What is clear is that research needs 
to continue to focus on the development of the built-environment in Belfast and Northern 
Ireland, and to continue to question the assumption capital accumulation benefits the 
wider population.  
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